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Time-Varying Uncertainty and the Credit Channel
Abstract
We extend the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model of business cycles by including time
varying uncertainty in the technology shocks that aﬀect capital production. We ﬁrst demonstrate that
standard linearization methods can be used to solve the model yet second moments enter the economy’s
equilibrium policy functions. We then demonstrate that an increase in uncertainty causes, ceteris paribus,
a fall in investment supply. A second key result is that time varying uncertainty results in countercyclical
bankruptcy rates - a ﬁnding which is consistent with the data and opposite the result in Carlstrom and
Fuerst. Third, we show that persistence of uncertainty aﬀects both quantitatively and qualitatively
the behavior of the economy. However, the shocks to uncertainty imply a quantitatively small role for
uncertainty over the business cycle.
• JEL Classiﬁcation: E4, E5, E2
• Keywords: agency costs, credit channel, time-varying uncertainty.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The impact of risk on aggregate investment and lending activity, while extensively studied in
theoretical models, has received little attention in quantitative macroeconomic settings. In large
part, this has been due to computational methods, i.e. linearization methods, which impose cer-
tainty equivalence so that second moments play no role. We address this omission in this paper
by using the credit channel model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). In particular, we model
time varying uncertainty as a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the technology shocks
aﬀecting capital production and explore how changes in uncertainty aﬀect equilibrium character-
istics.1 This setting is useful for several reasons: First, the impact of uncertainty on investment
via the lending channel is fairly transparent so that economic intuition is enhanced. Second, the
economic environment is a variant of a typical real business cycle model so that key parameters
can be calibrated to the data. Third, we demonstrate that linearization solution methods can
be employed yet this does not eliminate the inﬂuence of second moments on equilibrium. That
is, in solving for the linear equilibrium policy functions, the vector of state variables includes the
variance of technology shocks buﬀeting the capital production sector.
The main results can be summarized as follows. In contrast to an aggregate technology shock
which aﬀects investment demand, we show that an increase in uncertainty results in a shift in the
investment supply schedule. In particular, an increase in uncertainty will cause an increase in the
price of capital and a fall in investment activity. Another important result is that time-varying un-
certainty produces countercyclical bankruptcy rates. In contrast, Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997)
analysis of aggregate technology shocks produced the counterfactual prediction of procyclical bank-
ruptcy rates.
On a less positive note, we also demonstrate that the quantitative magnitude of these eﬀects
1 Our choice of model and analysis of shocks to second moments is similar to that in Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2003) in which they examined the role that uncertainty and several other factors played in the Great
Depression. Given their interest in the particular historical eposide, they did not examine in detail the role that
uncertainty plays in a credit channel model.
1is small relative to that of an aggregate technology shock. While this result argues against the
importance of second moment eﬀects, we think it is premature to eliminate changes in uncertainty
as an important impulse mechanism to the economy. The credit channel model we examine has
as u ﬃciently simple structure so that linearization methods can be employed to analyze second
moments; it is quite possible, however, that this structure is precisely why uncertainty does not
play a critical quantitative role. (But it is true that, uncertainty shocks of the order recently
studied in the paper by Bloom (2005) would indeed have quantitatively meaningful eﬀects.) We
see our eﬀorts as primarily pedagogical and argue that richer (e.g. non-linear) environments and
more sophisticated numerical methods will be needed to fully explore the role of time-varying
uncertainty.
2M o d e l
We employ the agency cost business cycle model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) to address the
ﬁnancial intermediaries’ role in the propagation of productivity shocks and extend their analysis
by introducing time-varying uncertainty. Since, for the most part, the model is identical to that in
Carlstrom and Fuerst, the exposition of the model will be brief with primary focus on the lending
channel. A full presentation of the model is given in the appendix.
The model is a variant of a standard RBC model in which an additional production sector is
added. This sector produces capital using a technology which transforms investment into capital.
In a standard RBC framework, this conversion is always one-to-one; in the Carlstrom and Fuerst
framework, the production technology is subject to technology shocks. (The aggregate production
technology is also subject to technology shocks as is standard.) This capital production sector
is owned by entrepreneurs who ﬁnance their production via loans from a risk neutral ﬁnancial
intermediation sector - this lending channel is characterized by a loan contract with a ﬁxed interest
rate. (Both capital production and the loans are intra-period.) If a capital producing ﬁrm realizes
2a low technology shock, it will declare bankruptcy and the ﬁnancial intermediary will take over
production; this activity is subject to monitoring costs.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks and uncertainty shocks, denoted (θt,σω,t),
is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce output
via an aggregate production function.
3. Households make their labor, consumption and savings/investment decisions. The household
transfers qt consumption goods to the banking sector for each unit of investment.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to entrepre-
neurs via the optimal ﬁnancial contract. The contract is deﬁned by the size of the loan (it)
and a cutoﬀ level of productivity for the entrepreneurs technology shock, ¯ ωt.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector as inputs into their
capital-creation technology.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If ωj,t ≥ ¯ ωt the entre-
preneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost of μit.
7. Entrpreneurs that are solvent make consumption choices; these in part determine their net
worth for the next period.
A schematic of the implied ﬂows is presented in Figure 1 and complete description of the
economy is given in the appendix. We now focus on the lending contract and the role of time
varying uncertainty.
32.1 Optimal Financial Contract
The optimal ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneur and the Capital Mutual Fund is described
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). But for expository purposes as well as to explain our approach
in addressing the second moment eﬀect on equilibrium conditions, we brieﬂy outline the model.
In deriving the optimal contract, both entrepreneurs and lenders take the price of capital, q,a n d
net worth, n,a sg i v e n .
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms it units of consumption
into ωtit units of capital. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), the technology shock ωt was assumed
to be distributed as i.i.d.w i t hE (ωt)=1 . While we maintain the assumption of constant mean,
we assume that the standard deviation is time-varying. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the standard





where ζ ∈ (0,1) and ut ∼ i.i.d with a mean of unity.2 The unconditional mean of the standard
deviation is given by ¯ σω. The realization of ωt is privately observed by entrepreneur — banks can
observe the realization at a cost of μit units of consumption.
The entrepreneur enters period t with one unit of labor endowment and zt units of capital.
Labor is supplied inelastically while capital is rented to ﬁrms, hence income in the period is
wt + rtzt. This income along with remaining capital determines net worth (denoted as nt and
denominated in units of consumption) at time t:
nt = wt + zt (rt + qt (1 − δ)) (2)
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (it − nt) consumption goods and agrees
2 This autoregressive process is used so that, when the model is log- linearized, ˆ σω,t (deﬁned as the percentage




(it − nt) capital goods to the lender, where rk is the interest rate on loans.







≡ ¯ ωt (3)
The optimal borrowing contract is given by the pair (it, ¯ ωt) that maximizes entrepreneur’s
return subject to the lender’s willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). Denoting
the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of ωt as Φ(ωt;σω,t) and φ(ωt;σω,t) respectively, the contract is determined
by the solution to:3:
max
{i,¯ ω}





ωφ(ω;σω,t)dω − [1 − Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)] ¯ ωt





ωφ(ω;σω,t)dω +[1− Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)] ¯ ωt − Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)μ
which represents the lender’s fraction of expected capital output, Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t) is the bankruptcy
rate.. Also note that f (¯ ωt;σω,t)+g(¯ ωt;σω,t)=1− Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)μ : the right hands side is the
average amount of capital that is produced. This is split between entrepreneurs and lenders while
monitoring costs reduce net capital production.
The necessary conditions for the optimal contract problem are
∂ (.)
∂¯ ω
: qif0 (¯ ω)=−λqi
∂g(¯ ωt;σω,t)
∂¯ ω
3 The notation Φ (ω;σω,t) is used to denote that the distribution function is time-varying as determined by the
realization of the random variable, σω,t. For expositional purposes, we suppress the time notation on the price of
capital and net worth since these are treated as parameters in this section.
5where λt is the shadow price of capital. Using the deﬁnitions of f (¯ ωt;σω,t) and g (¯ ωt;σω,t),t h i s






1 − Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)
μ (4)
As shown by eq.(4), the shadow price of capital is an increasing function of the relevant Inverse
Mill’s ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy) and the agency costs. If the
product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals the cost of capital production,
i.e. λt =1 .
The second necessary condition is:
∂ (.)
∂it
: qf (¯ ωt;σω,t)=−λt [1 − qg(¯ ωt;σω,t)]
Solving for q using the ﬁrst order conditions, we have
q−1 =
"
(f (¯ ωt;σω,t)+g(¯ ωt;σω,t)) +







1 − Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)μ +




≡ [1 − D(¯ ωt,σω,t)] = F (¯ ωt,σω,t)
where D(¯ ωt;σω,t) can be thought of as the total default costs.
It is straightforward to show that equation (5) deﬁnes an implicit function ¯ ω(q,σω,t) that is
increasing in q. Also note that, in equilibrium, the price of capital, q,d i ﬀers from unity due to
the presence of the credit market frictions. (Note that
∂f(¯ ωt;σω,t)
∂¯ ω = Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t) − 1 < 0.)
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
it =
1
(1 − qg(¯ ωt;σω,t))
n (6)
Equation (6) implies that investment is linear in net worth and deﬁnes a function that represents
6the amount of consumption goods placed in to the capital technology: i(q,n,σω,t).T h e f a c t t h a t
the function is linear implies that the aggregate investment function is well deﬁned.
The eﬀect of an increase in uncertainty on investment in this model can be understood by ﬁrst
turning to eq. (5). Under the assumption that the price of capital is unchanged, this implies that
the costs of default, represented in the function D(¯ ωt,σω,t), must also be unchanged. With a
mean-preserving spread in the distribution for ωt,t h i si m p l i e st h a t¯ ωt will fall. As a consequence,
the lenders’ expected capital return, g(¯ ωt;σω,t),w i l la l s of a l ls i n c e ,a ss h o w ni nt h ea p p e n d i x ,
g (¯ ωt;σω,t) ≈ ¯ ωt. Given the incentive compatibility constraint,
qitg(¯ ωt;σω,t)=( it − n)
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in it. This relationship is shown numerically (using
the parameter values described in the next section) in Figure 2.
The eﬀects of the two technology shocks: the aggregate technology shock, θt, and the un-
certainty shock, σω,t, on the capital market can be summarized graphically as shown in Figure
3. While not analyzed explicitly here, an aggregate technology shock shifts the location of the
capital demand curve as both the income eﬀect and, if shocks are positively autocorrelated, the
substitution eﬀect of higher expected marginal productivity of capital causes the demand curve
to shift outward for a positive technology shock. This will, ceteris paribus, cause the price of
capital to increase; note this explains the procyclical bankruptcy rates in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) given that ∂¯ ω/∂q>0 as mentioned previously. In contrast, an increase in uncertainty
causes the investment supply function to shift leftward resulting in a higher price of capital but
smaller quantity of investment. These partial equilibrium results are not overturned in the general
equilibrium setup.
72.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the economy is represented by market clearing in four markets: the labor markets
for households and entrepreneurs and the goods markets for consumption and capital. Letting
(Ht,He
t ) denote the aggregate labor supply of, respectively households and entrepreneurs, we have
Ht =( 1− η)lt (7)




t = η (8)
Goods market equilibrium is represented by
Ct + It = Yt (9)
where Ct =( 1− η)ct +ηce
t and It = ηit. (Note upper case variables denotes aggregate quantities
while lower case denote per-capita quantities.)
The law of motion of aggregate capital is given by:
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt +It [1 − Φ(¯ ωt;σω,t)μ] (10)
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the decision rules for (aggregate capital, entrepreneurs
capital, household labor, entrepreneur’s labor, the price of capital, entrepreneur’s net worth, in-
vestment, the cutoﬀ productivity level, household consumption, and entrepreneur’s consumption)
given by the vector: {Kt+1,Z t+1,H t,He
t ,q t,n t,i t, ¯ ωt,c t,c e
t} where these decision rules are station-
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ω,tut+1 where ut ∼ i.i.d. with E(ut)=1 (19)
The ﬁrst equation represents the labor-leisure choice for households while the second equation
is the necessary condition associated with household’s savings decision. The third and fourth
equation are from the optimal lending contract while the ﬁfth equation is the necessary condition
associated with entrepreneur’s savings decision. The sixth equation is the determination of net
worth while the seventh gives the evolution of entrepreneur’s capital. (The evolution of aggregate
capital is given in eq. (10)). The ﬁnal two equations represent the laws of motion for the aggregate
technology and uncertainty shock respectively.
4 A more thorough presentation of the equilibrium conditions are presented in the Appendix.
93 Equilibrium Characteristics
3.1 Steady-state analysis
While our focus is primarily on the cyclical behavior of the economy, an examination of the steady-
state properties of the economy is useful for two reasons. First, by studying the interaction
between uncertainty (i.e. the variance of the technology shock aﬀecting the capital production
sector) and the steady-state, the intuition for how time-varying uncertainty aﬀects the cyclical
characteristics of the economy is improved. Second, it is important to point out that changes in the
second moment of technology shocks aﬀect the level of the economy - most notably consumption
and output. That is, since the cyclical analysis presented in the next section is characterized
in terms of deviations from steady-state, the impact of changes in uncertainty on the level of
economic activity is lost.5
For this analysis, we use, to a large extent, the parameters employed in Carlstrom and Fuerst’s
(1997) analysis. Speciﬁcally, the following parameter values are used:
Table 1: Parameter Values
βαδμ
0.99 0.36 0.02 0.25
Agents discount factor, the depreciation rate and capital’s share are fairly standard in RBC
analysis. The remaining parameter, μ, represents the monitoring costs associated with bank-
ruptcy. This value, as noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is relatively prudent given estimates
of bankruptcy costs (which range from 20% (Altman (1984) to 36% (Alderson and Betker (1995)
of ﬁrm assets).
The remaining parameters, (σ,γ), determine the steady-state bankruptcy rate (which we de-
note as br and is expressed in percentage terms) and the risk premium (denoted rp) associated
5 This statement is in reference to Lucas’s analysis of the cost of business cycles (Lucas (1987) in which the
trend and cycle are treated as distinct. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that the cyclical behavior of the
economy has implications for the level of the steady-state. If one were using an endogenous growth model, cyclical
behavior may well have implications for the trend.
10with bank loans.6 To examine the role of uncertainty on the steady-state behavior of the economy,
we hold the bankruptcy rate constant to that studied in Carlstrom and Fuerst and increase the
standard deviation by slightly less than 50%; the implied values for γ and the risk premium are
given in Table 2:7
Table 2: Parameter Values




Economy II 0.30 2.42% 0.954
The eﬀect of greater uncertainy in the capital production sector is seen in Table 3. (All values
in Table 3 are percentage changes relative to the Carlstrom and Fuerst economy.) Consistent
with the partial equilibrium analysis presented earlier, a mean-preserving spread in entrepreneur’s
technology shock causes the price of capital to increase and steady-state capital to fall. This also
implies a decrease in consumption, a slight increase in steady-state labor, and a fall in steady-state
output.
6 The fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy, η, is not a critical parameter for the behavior of the economy. As
Carlstrom and Fuerst note, it is simply a normalization. Aggregate consumption in the model is indeed a weighted
average of household and entrepreneurial consumption but the weights are determined by the steady-state level of
per-capita consumption for these groups. This is endogenously determined - but not by η. T h i si sd e m o n s t r a t e d
at the end of the Appendix.
7 As discussed in Carlstrom and Fuerst, a bankruptcy rate of 0.974% (per quarter) and an annual risk premium
of 187 basis points are broadly consistent with U.S. data.
11Table 3: Steady-State Eﬀects of Greater Uncertainty










A sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n2 ,e q s . (11) through (19) determine the equilibrium properties of the
economy. To analyze the cyclical properties of the economy, we linearize (i.e. take a ﬁrst-order
Taylor series expansion) of these equations around the steady-state values and express all terms as
percentage deviations from steady-state values. This numerical approximation method is standard
in quantitative macroeconomics. What is not standard in this model is that the second moment
of technology shocks hitting the capital production sector will inﬂuence equilibrium behavior and,
therefore, the equilibrium policy rules. That is, linearizing the equilibrium conditions around
the steady-state typically imposes certainty equivalence so that variances do not matter. In
this model, however, the variance of the technology shock can be treated as an additional state
variable through its role in determining lending activities and, in particular, the nature of the
lending contract.8 Linearizing the system of equilibrium conditions does not eliminate that role
in this economy and, hence, we think that this is an attractive feature of the model.
While the previous section analyzed the steady-state behavior of four diﬀerent economies, in
8 Speciﬁcally, ωt is assumed to be log normally distributed. Hence, the linear approximation to the equations
describing the ﬁnancial contract (eqs. (24) and (25)) will include the second moment of ωt.
12this section we employ the same parameters as in the Carlstrom and Fuerst model (Economy I
in the previous section). We depart from Carlstrom and Fuerst by relaxing the i.i.d. assumption
for the capital sector technology shock. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h el a wo fm o t i o nf o rt h es t a n d a r d






As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the standard deviation of the technology shock ωt is, on average,
equal to 0.207. That is, we set ¯ σω =0 .207. We then examine two diﬀerent economies character-
ized by the persistence in uncertainty, i.e. the parameter ζ. In the low persistence economy, we
set ζ =0 .05 while in the moderate persistence economy we set ζ =0 .90. The behavior of these
two economies is analyzed by examining the impulse response functions of several key variables
to a 1% innovation in σω. These are presented in Figures 4-6.
We ﬁrst turn to aggregate output and household consumption and investment. With greater
uncertainty, the bankruptcy rate increases in the economy (this is veriﬁed in Figure 5), which
implies that agency costs increase. The rate of return on investment for the economy therefore
falls. Households, in response, reduce investment and increase consumption and leisure. The
latter response causes output to fall. Note that the consumption and leisure response is increasing
in the degree of persistence. This is not the case, however, for investment - this is due to the
i n c r e a s ei nt h ep r i c eo fc a p i t a l( s e eF i g u r e5 )a n dr e ﬂects the behavior of entrepreneurs. This
behavior is understood after ﬁrst examining the lending channel.
The increase in uncertainty aﬀects, predictably, all three key variables in the lending channel:
the price of capital, the risk premium associated with loans and the bankruptcy rate. As already
mentioned, the bankruptcy rate increases and, in the high persistence economy, this increased rate
of bankruptcy lasts for several quarters. This result implies that the bankruptcy rate is counter-
cyclical in this economy; in contrast, in the analysis by Carlstrom and Fuerst the bankruptcy rate
13was, counterfactually, procyclical.9 Their focus was on the eﬀects of innovation to the aggregate
technology shock and, because of the assumed persistence in this shock, is driven by the change
in the ﬁrst moment of the aggregate production shock. Our analysis demonstrates that second
moment eﬀe c t sm a yp l a yas i g n i ﬁcant role in these correlations over the business cycle. Further
research, both empirical and theoretical, in this area would be fruitful . Returning to the model,
the increased bankruptcy rate implies that the price of capital is greater and this increase lasts
longer in the high persistence economy. The same is true for the risk premium on loans.
Figure 6 reports the consumption and net worth of entrepreneurs in the economies. In contrast
to all other variables, persistence has a dramatic qualitative eﬀect on entrepreneurs’ behavior.
With low persistence, entrepreneurs exploit the high price of capital to increase consumption: the
lack persistence provides no incentive to increase investment. Since the price of capital quickly
returns to its steady-state values, the increased consumption erodes entrepreneurs’ net worth. To
restore net worth to its steady-state value, consumption falls temporarily. The behavior in the
high persistence economy is quite diﬀerent: the price of capital is high and forecast to stay high
so investment increases dramatically. Initially, the investment is ﬁnanced by lower consumption,
but as entrepreneurs net worth increases (due to greater capital and a higher price of capital)
consumption also increases. This endogenous response by entrepreneurs is why, in the high
persistence economy, the initial fall in aggregate investment is not as great in the high persistence
economy.
A further analysis of the equilibrium characteristics of the high persistence economy is pre-
sented in Table 4 in which a few, key second moments are reported. For comparison, the moments
implied by the model when subject to total factor productivity shocks (θt) or information shocks
(σω) are given along with the corresponding moments from the US data. Note that, while time
varying uncertainty induces greater volatility in labor, investment, and the capital stock, the dis-
9 In the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model, a technology shock increases output and the demand for capi-
tal. The resulting increase in the price of capital implies greater lending activity and, hence, an increase in the
bankruptcy rate (and risk premia). Here, greater uncertainty results in greater bankruptcy rates even though
investment falls; since labor is also reduced, this produces countercyclical bankruptcy rates and risk premia.
14crepancy between the moments from the artiﬁcial economy and the actual data are not that much
diﬀerent than arising from a standard RBC model subject to productivity shocks. This behavior
stands in stark contrast to the ﬁnancial intermediation model of Cooper and Ejarque (2000) in
which labor and investment were countercyclical and capital stock volatility was over 5 times
greater than GDP volatility.10 Their analysis did not present an explicit model of the ﬁnancial
intermediation sector and our analysis suggests that the endogenous response of this sector to
shocks is important and leads to improved performance of the model. The model does imply
negative correlation between consumption and investment hence we reach the same conclusion as
Cooper and Ejarque (1997): shocks to uncertainty can not be the dominant shock in the economy
since this correlation is counterfactual to business cycle behavior. This observation does not, in
our opinion, rule out uncertainty as playing a role in business cycle behavior - it simply can not
be the sole or dominant factor. A second important feature seen in Table 4 is the quantitatively
small role that second moment shocks have on the economy; as seen in the ﬁrst column, a 1%
innovation to the aggregate technology shock produces volatility in GDP over 60 times larger than
that from a comparable shock to the conditional standard deviation. This is addressed in the
next section.
10 Cooper and Ejarque (2000) analyze two versions of their model: one in which ﬁnancial intermediation plays a
role in ﬁnancing both undepreciated and new capital and another in which only new capital (i.e. investment) uses
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The countercyclical behavior of labor and investment is seen in the ﬁrst version; however,
both models exhibit high volatility of the capital stock.
15Table 4: Business Cycle Characteristics11
Volatility relative to y Correlation with y
shocks σy chik chi k
θ 0.046 0.63 0.59 2.72 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.91 0.65
σω 0.0007 0.64 1.43 5.14 1.03 -0.54 0.93 0.97 0.36
US data12 1.71 0.49 0.86 3.15 0.36 0.76 0.86 0.90 -0.08
4C o n c l u s i o n
The eﬀect of uncertainty as characterized by second moment eﬀects has been largely ignored in
quantitative macroeconomics due to the numerical approximation methods typically employed
during the computational exercise. The analysis presented here uses standard solution methods
(i.e. linearizing around the steady-state) but exploits features of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
agency cost model of business cycles so that time varying uncertainty can be analyzed. While
development of more general solution methods that capture second moments eﬀects is encouraged,
we think that the intuitive nature of this model and its standard solution method make it an
attractive environment to study the eﬀects of time-varying uncertainty.
Our primary ﬁndings fall into four broad categories. First, we demonstrate that uncertainty
aﬀects the level of the steady-state of the economy so that welfare analysis of uncertainty that focus
entirely on the variability of output (or consumption) will understate the true costs of uncertainty.
Second, we demonstrate that time varying uncertainty results in countercyclical bankruptcy rates
-aﬁnding which is consistent with the data and opposite the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst.
Third, we show that persistence of uncertainty eﬀects both quantitatively and qualitatively the
behavior of the economy. Quantitatively, however, the impact of an increase is signiﬁcantly less
than that of an aggregate technology shock. We conclude that further research is needed in
11 For this comparative analysis, the standard deviation of the innovation to both shocks was assumed to be
0.007. This ﬁgure is typical for total factor productivity shocks but whether this is a good ﬁgure for shocks to
the second moments is an open question. We also assumed that both shocks exhibit high persistence with an
autocorrelation of 0.95 for θt and 0.90 for σω.
12 The US ﬁgures are from Kydland and Prescott (1990).
16(at least) two dimensions: the characterization of uncertainty shocks (i.e., second moments or
rare catastrophic events) and the development of richer theoretical models which introduce more
non-linearities in the equations deﬁning equilibrium.
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185 Appendix:
5.1 The Lending Channel: Approximation analysis
To ﬁnd a simple analytical formula for investment in the partial equilibrium model described in
the text, is convenient to assume to use the substitution ω =e x p( ω1) in order to use the normal
rather than lognormal distribution for the technology shock ωt. Using this permits equations (5)
and (6) to be expressed in the form
i
n
=( 1 − qg1(ω1,σ))−1, (20)
1 −q−1
μ




where f1 (ω1,σ)=f (ω,σ),g 1 (ω1,σ)=g(ω,σ) and so forth.
We need to ﬁnd a simple approximation for the equations above. To do that we will use
the asymptotic expansion on large parameter |ω1/σ|À1. Evaluated at steady-state levels, the
numerical value of ω1/σ ≈− 2.4 and so can be considered as “large” here since its square appears
as an argument of exponent function. Then we have the following representations of terms in









































' 1 − exp(ω1),
g1(ω1,σ)=1 − μΦ1(ω1,σ) −f1(ω1,σ) ' exp(ω1)





















































Here we assume −X to be a large negative number and perform variable substitution x =
−X − y/X. Note that neglecting the term −
y
2
2X2 in the exponent under the integral produces
the zero-order term of an asymptotic series. (For the detailed theory of asymptotic series and its
applications see Olver (1997).) The approximation for f1(ω1,σ) and g1(ω1,σ) uses the smallness
of Φ1(ω1,σ), which is equal to the bankruptcy rate br ' 0.00974. The last integral term in the
expression for f1(ω1,σ) diﬀers from Φ1(ω1,σ) by the factor exp(σx)under the integral, which is
smaller than 1, because the range of integration is negative. So that term is less than Φ1(ω1,σ)
and can be also neglected.
Substituting (22) into (20) and (21) we arrive to the relations:
i
n











































































The asymptotic solution of (25) can be obtained using logarithmic precision. For that we can
assume ω1 ' ωs(ωs is the constant steady-state value) in the expression for w(ω1) and iterate
(25) one time:
ω1 ' −cσσ,








. Substituting the last formula into
(23) we obtain the ﬁnal relation:
i
n
' (1 − qexp(−cσσ))−1
Figure 2 graphs this relationship along with the exact relationship determined via numerical




The representative household is inﬁnitely lived and has expected utility over consumption ct and





t [ln(ct)+ν (1 − lt)] (26)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator on time zero information, β ∈ (0,1), ν > 0,
and lt is time t labor. The household supplies labor, lt, and rents its accumulated capital stock, kt,
to ﬁrms at the market clearing real wage, wt, and rental rate rt, respectively, thus earning a total
income of wtlt +rtkt. The household then purchases consumption good from ﬁrms at price of one
(i.e. consumption is the numeraire), and purchases new capital, it, at a price of qt. Consequently,
the household’s budget constraint is
wtlt +rtkt ≥ ct + qtit (27)
The law of motion for households’ capital stock is standard:
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it (28)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate on capital.
The necessary conditions associated with the maximization problem include the standard labor-
leisure condition and the intertemporal eﬃciency condition associated with investment. Given
the functional form for preferences, these are:


















where Yt represents the aggregate output, θt denotes the aggregate technology shock, Kt denotes
the aggregate capital stock, Ht denotes the aggregate household labor supply, He
t denotes the
aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor, and αK + αH + αHe =1 .14
The proﬁt maximizing representative ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions are given by the factor mar-
















t denotes the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor.
5.2.3 Entrepreneurs
A risk neutral representative entrepreneur’s course of action is as follows. To ﬁnance his project
at period t, he borrows resources from the Capital Mutual Fund according to an optimal ﬁnancial
contract. The entire borrowed resources, along with his total net worth at period t,a r et h e n
13 Note that we denote aggregate variables with upper case while lower case represents per-capita values. Prices
are also lower case.
14 As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, we assume that the entrepreneur’s labor share is small, in particular, αHe =0 .0001.
The inclusion of entrepreneurs’ labor into the aggregate production function serves as a technical device so that
entrepreneurs’ net worth is always positive, even when insolvent.
23invested into his capital creation project. If the representative entrepreneur is solvent after ob-
serving his own technology shock, he then makes his consumption decision; otherwise, he declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored (at a cost) by the Capital Mutual Fund.
5.3 Entrepreneur’s Consumption Choice
To rule out self-ﬁnancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the household.








t denotes entrepreneur’s consumption at date t, and γ ∈ (0,1). This new parameter, γ,w i l l
be chosen so that it oﬀsets the steady-state internal rate of return to entrepreneurs’ investment.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneur ﬁnances consumption out of the returns from the











Note that the expected return to internal fund is
qtf(¯ ω;σω,t)it
nt ; that is, the net worth of size
nt is leveraged into a project of size it, entrepreneurs keep the share of the capital produced and
capital is priced at qt consumption goods. Since these are intra-period loans, the opportunity cost
is 1.15
Consequently, the representative entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function in equa-
tion (35) over consumption and capital subject to the law of motion for capital, equation (36),
15 As noted above, we require in steady-state 1=γ
qtf(¯ ωt)
(1−qtg(¯ ωt)).






(1 − qt+1g(¯ ω;σω,t))
¶¾
5.4 Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral ﬁnancial intermediaries who earn no proﬁt
and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in this
economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital production can be eliminated.
The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepreciated capital in advance
of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital through loan repayment
and through monitoring of insolvent ﬁrms, and, ﬁnally, those entrepreneur’s that are still solvent,
sell some of their capital to the CMF to ﬁnance current period consumption. This capital is then
sold at the price of qt units of consumption to households for their investment plans.
5.5 Steady-state conditions in the Carlstrom and Fuerst Agency Cost
Model
We ﬁrst present the equilibrium conditions and express these in scaled (by the fraction of entre-
preneurs in the economy) terms. Then the equations are analyzed for steady-state implications.
As in the text, upper case variables denote aggregate wide while lower case represent household
variables. Preferences and technology are:
U (˜ c,1 − l)=l n ˜ c +ν (1 − l)
Y = θKα [(1 − η)l]
1−α−φ ηφ
Where η denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and θ is the technology shock.
Note that aggregate household labor is L =( 1− η)l while entrepreneurs inelastically supply one
25unit of labor. We assume that the share of entrepreneur’s labor is approximately zero so that the
production function is simply
Y = θKα [(1 − η)l]
1−α
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs receive no wage income (see eq. (9) in C&F.
There are nine equilibrium conditions:
The resource constraint
(1− η)˜ ct + ηce
t +ηit = Yt = θtKα




η , h =
(1−η)
η l,a n dkt = Kt
η then eq(37) c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
ct + ce
t +it = θtkα
t h1−α
t (38)










1−ην, this can be expressed as:




26L a wo fm o t i o no fa g g r e g a t ec a p i t a ls t o c k
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt +ηit [1 − Φ(¯ ω;σω,t)μ]
Dividing by η yields the scaled version:
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it [1 − Φ(¯ ω;σω,t)μ] (40)











t+1 [(1 − η)lt+1]
1−α
i¾
Dividing both sides by
1−η





























1 − qtg (¯ ω;σω,t)
(43)
27Where nt is entrepreneur’s net worth.
Determination of net worth
ηnt = Zt
h
qt (1 − δ)+θtK
α−1
t [(1 − η)lt]
1−αi
o r ,i ns c a l e dt e r m s :
nt = zt
£





Note that zt denotes (scaled) entrepreneur’s capital.





















Entrepreneur’s intertemporal eﬃciency condition
qt = γβEt
½h
qt+1 (1 − δ)+θt+1αK
α−1
t+1 [(1 − η)lt+1]
1−αiµ
qt+1f (¯ ω;σω,t)
1 − qt+1g (¯ ω;σω,t)
¶¾
Or, in scaled terms:
qt = γβEt
½£







1 − qt+1g(¯ ω;σω,t)
¶¾
(46)
285.6 Deﬁnition of Steady-state
Steady-state is deﬁned by time-invariant quantities:
ct =ˆ c,ce
t =ˆ ce,k t = ˆ k, ¯ ωt =ˆ ω,h t = ˆ h,qt =ˆ q,zt =ˆ z,nt =ˆ n,it =ˆ ı
So there are nine unknowns. While we have nine equilibrium conditions, the two intertemporal
eﬃciency conditions become identical in steady-state since C&F impose the condition that the
internal rate of return to entrepreneur is oﬀset by their additional discount factor:
γ
µ
ˆ qf (ˆ ω)
1 − ˆ qg(ˆ ω)
¶
=1 (47)
This results in an indeterminacy - but there is a block recursiveness of the model due to the
calibration exercise. In particular, we demonstrate that the risk premium and bankruptcy rate
determine (ˆ ω,σ) - these in turn determine the steady-state price of capital. From eq.(41)we have:
ˆ q =
αβ
1 − β (1 − δ)
ˆ kα−1ˆ h1−α =
αβ


















1 − Φ(ˆ ω)μ
δ
ˆ ı (50)
Note that these three equations are normally (i.e. in a typical RBC framework) used to ﬁnd
steady-state
³
ˆ k,ˆ h, ˆ c
´
-b e c a u s eˆ q =1 . Here since the price of capital is endogenous, we have four
29unknowns. From eq. (44)and eq. (41)we have
ˆ n =ˆ z
µ








From eq. (45)and the restriction on the entrepreneur’s additional discount factor (eq. (47)), we
have














We have the two conditions from the ﬁnancial contract
ˆ q =
1







1 − ˆ q(1− Φ(ˆ ω)μ − f (ˆ ω))
ˆ n (55)
Finally, we have the resource constraint:
ˆ c +ˆ ce +ˆ ı = ˆ kαˆ h1−α (56)
The eight equations (48),(49),(50),(51),(52),(54),(55),(56) are insuﬃcient to ﬁnd the nine
unknowns. However, the risk premium, denoted as ζ,i sd e ﬁned by the following
ˆ qˆ ω
ˆ ı
ˆ ı − ˆ n
= ζ (57)
30But we also know (from eq.(55) that
ˆ n
ˆ ı







substituting from the previous expression yields
ˆ ω = ζg(ˆ ω) (58)
Let br = bankruptcy rate — this observable also provides another condition on the distribution.
That is, we require:
Φ(ˆ ω)=br (59)
The two equations eq.(58) and eq. (59) can be solved for the two unknowns - (ˆ ω,σ).B y v a r y i n g
t h eb a n k r u p t c yr a t ea n dt h er i s kp r e m i u m ,w ec a nd e t e r m i n ed i ﬀerent levels of uncertainty (σ)and
the cutoﬀ point (ˆ ω).
Note that the price of capital in steady-state, is a function of (ˆ ω,σ) as determined by eq. (54).
The other preference parameter, γ is then determined by eq. (47). Once this is determined, the re-
maining unknowns:
³
ˆ c, ˆ ce,ˆ h,ˆ ı,ˆ k,ˆ z,ˆ n
´
are determined by eqs. (48),(49),(50),(51),(53),(55),(56).
Finally, we note that the parameter η does not play a role in the characteristics of equilibrium
and, in particular, the behavior of aggregate consumption. This can be seen by ﬁrst deﬁning
aggregate consumption:
(1 − η)˜ ct +ηce
t = CA
t






Since the policy rules for household and entrepreneurial consumption are deﬁned as the per-




t ,percentage deviations of aggregate consumption and scaled aggregate con-
sumption are identical). Using an asterisk to denote percentage deviations from steady-state, we
have:
ˆ c
ˆ c +ˆ cec∗
t +
ˆ ce
ˆ c +ˆ cece∗
t = cA∗
t (61)





























Figure 1:  Flow of Funds in Credit Channel Model 
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Figure 2: Exact and Approximate behavior of (i/n) as a function of σ 
 
 








Figure 3: Technology and Uncertainty Shocks: 






Technology shock: A to B 
C 
Uncertainty shock: A to C  38 
 
Figure 4:  Response of Output, Consumption, and Investment 
Low and High Persistence Economies 
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Figure 5:  Response of Price of Capital, Risk Premia, and Bankruptcy Rate 
Low and High Persistence Economies 
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Figure 6:  Response of Entrepreneur’s Consumption and Net Worth 










































     
 
 
 